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 Only in recent times has the international economic community turned its 
attention to the necessity of respecting human dignity in the pursuit of capitalistic 
success. Measures like the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights have been upheld as standards to which all nations should aspire: 
  “Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of  
  Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from 
  fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby  
  everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as well as 
   his civil and political rights…Considering the obligation of States under 
   the Charter of the United Nations to promote universal respect for, and 
   observance of, human rights and freedoms…” (ICESCR Preamble, 1976) 
 This covenant reflects the intention that nations of the world have displayed 
in upholding certain undisputable rights of the modern worker. Most members of 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have signed 
and ratified this covenant; the notable exception is the lack of U.S. ratification. The 
universal worker rights spelled out in the document are largely held as standardized 
goals around the world. Developed countries are often the loudest voices for 
increased worker rights, and have implemented economic regulation to enforce 
them. A large part of the regulation carried out by state actors around the world are 
designed to promote the very standards the United Nations has put forth. The OECD 
nations attempt to fulfill their “obligation of States” with service industry regulation, 
enforced through their respective governments. These nations would be quick to 
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assert their intentions in upholding human dignity in economic practice, but are 
their measures effective? Does more industry regulation actually translate into 
better employment standards for the citizens of these nations? 
 The goal of my research is to evaluate possible correlations between the 
amount of industry regulation implemented by OECD nations and their respective 
compliance with the provisions of Article 7 of ICESCR. Using statistical surveys 
supported by the OECD and the United Nations, I endeavor to find a link between 
government oversight and an increased capacity to guarantee their citizens “the 
right to the enjoyment of just and favorable conditions of work” (ICESCR Article III). 
 In general, the OECD nations are leaders in international forums like the 
United Nations, focusing on spreading policies and practices that uphold basic rights 
for their citizens. My research will help to determine whether the regulatory policies 
that OECD nations implement to keep their economic activity reputable are in fact 
promoting the human rights they eagerly champion on the international stage. 
Ultimately, I strive to answer the following research question: Are workers in OECD 
countries actually enjoying the rights and freedoms their leaders cite as non-
negotiable when crafting economic regulation? 
 My work will be carried out with the following methods. I will use the 
codified data provided by the OECD on relative levels of industry regulation for 
member nations, and conduct a regression analysis using those statistics as an 
independent measure of a country’s regulatory levels. To focus on the protections 
guaranteed by Article 7 of ICESCR, I will employ five dependent variables that reveal 
the extent to which citizens experience fair wages, healthy and safe working 
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conditions, equal employment opportunities, and adequate rest and leisure. The 
fair-wage dependent variable will be created from OECD statistics on average 
annual wage comparison by country. The worker health and safety dependent 
variable will be derived from OECD statistics on the percentage of out-of-pocket 
health care expenditure by each nation. The equal opportunity in employment 
dependent variable will be taken from OECD statistics, and separate analyses will be 
conducted for male and female unemployment rates by country. Finally, OECD 
statistics on average annual hours worked across nations will be used to ascertain 
comparative rest and leisure opportunities across nations. 
 Ideally, my study will make a strong statement as to the correlation between 
the extent of industry regulation and results manifested in the quality of life for 
citizens of OECD nations. This research thesis will fit well into the framework of my 
College Scholars Program major: International Dimensions of Corporate Litigation. 
With this project, I will be able to explore comparative legal regulation of industry 
across OECD nations and its respective effectiveness. I expect to gain a broader 
perspective on the effect of legal policy on industry across nations, as well as its 
impact on different citizenries. This thesis project will enrich my curriculum as I 
apply my legal and economic coursework to conducting an in-depth analysis of a 







II. Literature Review 
 Following World War II, the United States of America emerged as the 
hegemonic leader in a new system of global economic order.  Though America’s vast 
economic and military strength left it veritably unrivaled in global dominance, 
American policymakers and economic theorists were anxious to promote liberal 
multilateralism in post-war order. In contrast, Britain was focused on generating full 
employment and economic stability through imperial preference and bilateral trade. 
Ikenberry (1992) examined the “watershed” agreement that emerged at Bretton 
Woods, focusing on the compromise reached between American and British 
policymakers, economists, and monetary experts.  This compromise would 
eventually create the system of norms that have governed international trade for 
almost century. Additionally, this framework resulted in the creation of the OECD, 
and still carries heavy influence over the policies that its members pursue. 
 According to Ruggie (1982), this embedded liberalism was designed to 
promote a comparative advantage system on a multilateral scale in order to 
minimize, simultaneously, adjustment costs to society and political vulnerabilities 
that might result from national differences. Additionally, both John Maynard Keynes 
and Harry Dexter White sought to forge a compromise that would protect economic 
stability against divergences in economic development, interstate power relations, 
and domestic state-society relations. The Americans and their British counterparts 
eventually reached a compromise that incorporated overarching norms that would 
forever change the international economy. Chwieroth (2012) cites multilateral 
surveillance through international regimes like the World Bank and the 
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International Monetary fund, along with the non-discrimination in trade policies, as 
the most formal of these norms.  Informal norms included respect for domestic 
policy autonomy, an emergence of international public finance, and the emergence 
of inequality institutionalized in the governing systems of international institutions.   
 Ruggie (1982) argued that, after the collapse of the gold standard in the early 
1970’s, international economic regimes would continue to develop based on these 
shared norms instead of through an international hegemon. In turn, the demise of 
the dollar’s gold standard created a dilemma for the world’s leading powers. 
Developed nations reserved their commitment to creating a stable system of 
exchange that would not allow for the “beggar thy neighbor” policies that followed 
the First World War. Floating exchange rates were implemented to allow 
macroeconomic policy discretion to correct for instances of speculative, irrational 
“herd” behavior. These incentives allowed liberalization of trade regimes to expand. 
Ruggie used this development to justify his theory that embedded liberalism could 
endure in an international policy regime based on shared norms across national 
boundaries, even without a hegemon.  Today, the dollar has remained a key 
currency, more nations continue to commit to multilateralism, and currencies still 
retain convertibility. 
 While the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
would not be created until 1961, the Organization of European Economic Order, its 
predecessor, was created in 1947 to oversee the Marshall Plan (OECD 2012).  The 
formulation of such an institution represented one of the first nods to a collective 
international economic interest.  When the United States and Canada joined the 
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conference in 1961, the institution increased its influence across continents to 
streamline policy formation in an increasingly globalized world.  In fact, one of the 
first actions taken by the OECD nations, the Code of Liberalization of Capital 
Movements and Code of Current Invisible Operations loosened up the flow of capital 
in international markets and provided some basic ground rules for national open 
market operations (OECD 2013).   
Subsequently, two committees were formed by the organization in 1962: the 
Trade Union Advisory Committee and the Business and Industry Advisory 
Committee.  TUAC is key to presenting the views of organized labor to policymakers 
in the OECD; specifically, the committee works to provide a social dimension to the 
economic analysis that takes place within the body.  The committee currently 
harbors more than 58 trade union centers, representing around 66 million workers 
worldwide (OECD 2013).  BIAC reaches out to OECD delegates to advocate for the 
interests of the international business community through the work of 38 policy 
groups.  Over 2,100 business representatives work to advance the perspective of 
industry in the negotiation process (OECD 2013).  Furthermore, in 1962, John F. 
Kennedy’s proposal for an OECD Development Center came to fruition. This center 
brings OECD together to discuss issues of poverty reduction and social development 
(OECD 2013). The OECD Observer magazine was even created to disseminate the 
findings of OECD researchers and the progress reached by the body, to build bridges 
between nations about economic matters. 
Several fundamental international policy guides also originated in 
committees of the OECD. One particularly interesting product of OECD cooperation 
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has been the Frascati Manual, first published in 1963. This manual is the 
culmination of a joint effort to guide the statistical methods and R&D presentations 
of members of the OECD nations. It offers guidelines for the use and collection of 
international trade and demographic information useful to the OECD in the creation 
and implementation of new policies (OECD 2013). The OECD Economic Outlook was 
first published in 1963. From creation, its economic outlooks were designed to 
update world leaders and research institutes with predictions for future progress or 
regression. Generally, these outlooks are presented in briefings, often delivered by 
the OECD’s secretary general, and entail a macroeconomic focus for 
recommendations (OECD 2013).  
Beyond regulation of capital markets, the OECD has historically been 
influential in recommending policies for agriculture and the environment, as well. In 
1969, for example, international standards for trade in fruits and vegetables 
involved in commerce were passed. Beyond addressing agricultural issues, the 
OECD employs environment ministers who first met to discuss global climate 
change issues in 1974 (OECD 2013).  Through discussion and research, the OECD 
developed the ‘polluter pays principle’ to account for unforeseen environmental 
catastrophes such as oil spills. When major disasters strike, the council stated, the 
actor responsible for the damage should fund the clean-up effort. 
The United States and Britain have historically played major roles in this 
cooperative body, and thus their ideologies have been strongly reflected in its 
decision-making processes. In recent decades, the OECD has functioned as a forum 
for 34 member nations to discuss economic issues and promote solutions.  
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In particular, OECD nations have proclaimed that the goal of their cooperative 
efforts serves “to foster prosperity and fight poverty.” Undoubtedly, these nations 
have expressed their belief in both international and state regulations for advancing 
this aim. The work of Conway and Nicoletti (2006) is among those that have 
compared national regulation of the professional economies across nations. Conway 
and Nicoletti’s contribution, as to the extent of service industry regulation in various 
nations, provides a perfect springboard to ascertain which level of regulation most 
adequately meets the aims of the international community—specifically in regard to 
the furtherance of ICESCR.  
Other researchers have used various methods to explore the extent and the 
effectiveness of economic regulation across the professional sector, as well. 
For instance, Iain Paterson, Marcel Fink, and Anthony Ogus (2003) have explored 
liberal professional regulation and its impacts in the fifteen member nations of the 
EU. They cite regulation, at least to some degree, as necessary for the normal 
functioning of a market. Their reasoning concluded that regulation preserves 
competition, more effectively directs the production of public goods, avoids the 
negative externalities associated with low-quality services, and resolves 
informational asymmetries between professionals and clients (Paterson et al., 18). 
More specifically, they examined the legal, accounting, technical and pharmaceutical 
industries for presence of product, professional conduct, and market entry 
regulations. Their study found that even within the realm of the EU, regulation 
across the professional services varied greatly. Their findings indicated that, in 
general, strictly regulated professions generally had lower numbers of professionals. 
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However, the output of each individual professional was much higher. They thus 
concluded that regulation can promote economic benefit, though often at the 
expense of consumer welfare. Instead of focusing on economic benefits produced by 
economic regulation, though, this project will examine the effects of each OECD 
nation’s professional industry regulation on human welfare. 
 Galligan and Larking (2009), out of the University of Melbourne, suggest a 
degree of hypocrisy in the way the OECD handles free trade and regulation of 
economic practices, compared to their handling of human rights adjudication. The 
authors use their inquiry to highlight the reluctance of the U.S., specifically, to 
participate in covenants that involve international human rights—even while the 
nation simultaneously promotes the decisions of the WTO. The article suggested 
that this reluctance may stem from a U.S. desire to maintain its power status in the 
realm of human rights (Galligan and Larking 2009, 10). Further, the authors 
indicated that free trade has been established as critical to the interest of the U.S., 
while human economic and social rights are, in essence, circumstantially dependent 
and less suitable for legal regulation. Instead of limiting a critique to the United 
States, however, this project will attempt to question the human rights 
improvements delivered by each OECD nation in their professional sectors. 
  In a similar critical examination of professional regulation, Seibert (2008) 
analyzed the effectiveness of regulatory boards in promoting public welfare. This 
analysis concluded that government regulatory agencies essentially had the 
authority to act as a functioning monopoly over their respective fields. In short, 
restrictions to entry and other methods used by these boards drive up the cost of 
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services to consumers while simultaneously eliminating potential sources of rivalry 
within an industry. Her work also suggested that competition and market forces 
could prove much more effective in delivering benefits to consumers than those 
imposed by regulation (Seibert 30). Further, she asserted that decreased regulation 
would generate a greater level of competition and drive service prices lower. 
 Seibert (2008) is certainly not the only researcher to examine the effects of 
economic regulation on the professional sector. Debate over professional regulation 
has raged since the pioneering work of Friedman and Kuznets (1945), who 
examined regulation of the medical and dental industries. Also, in an assessment of 
the dental industry, Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) explored the effects of licensing 
restrictions. They concluded that licensing offered no gains to consumers in terms of 
overall dental health, but did increase the cost of service. Kleiner and Krueger 
(2008) later examined specifically the phenomenon of occupational licensing. Their 
study indicated that licensing can have a similar effect on the professional sector as 
a union, driving professional fees up by as much as fifteen percent. They also found 
that, as of 2006, 29 percent of the labor market was under professional regulation. 
Their study was limited to the United States, however, while my project will provide 
commentary on this phenomenon on a broader geographic scale, and across more 
industries. 
 In an examination centered on the outlook of human rights in Australia, 
Mapulanga-Hulston and Harpur (2009) have asserted that the claim of indivisibility 
in the realm of human rights has been reduced to mere rhetoric (Mapulanga-
Hulston and Harpur 49). They further claimed that the economic and social rights 
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expressed in ICESCR are relatively neglected when compared with political rights. In 
keeping with the enhancement of cultural rights, state ratification of a treaty such as 
ICESCR signifies a commitment to comply with its aims domestically. State parties, 
after all, are required to present reports updating compliance with ICESCR’s aims 
directly to the United Nations. While sometimes treaty ratification can be the first 
step in a positive direction, though, Hathaway (2002) has concluded that nations 
commonly skirt their obligations to comply with the tenets of human rights treaties 
that they have ratified. Mapulanga-Hulston and Harpur (2009) go on to cite the 
example of Australia, which ratified ICESCR in 1975 but as of today still resists its 
enforceability in domestic operations. The nation asserts that economic, social and 
cultural rights are delegated to the people already through common law and other 
acts of the domestic legislature. Even so, the article itself reiterates that all states 
that are a party to ICESCR must attempt to deliver basic rights of housing, health 
care, and sustenance for at risk populations with their domain. Amnesty 
international, in fact, has called Australia’s compliance with these tenets into 
question (Mapulanga-Hulston and Harpur 61). The authors further suggest that a 
bill of rights for the Australian people might be the most effective means for 
ensuring ICESCR compliance. Their study, though, did not generate a greater 
understanding of the worldwide situation in regard to compliance with ICESCR, 
which is one of the aims of this project. 
 Leader (2008) has already called into question the regulatory proceedings of 
the OECD in human rights protection. His examination of human rights abuses in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo has inspired calls for a more effective system of 
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accountability than the “soft law” provisions of the OECD. In 2000, a UN Panel of 
Experts launched an inquiry into the management of the Congo’s natural resources, 
only to discover vast amounts of exploitation and corporate abuses. The panel 
returned findings that corporations had violated even the comparably lax OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Corporations. However, the guidelines are only 
voluntary suggestions that protect consumers, organizational transparency, 
technology rights, and competition. Leader’s study has suggested that these 
guidelines are a well-established starting point for creating a system of governing 
principles that will be enforceable against the actions of multinational corporations. 
 With a focus on the struggle to achieve the Millennium Development Goals 
and an attention on the goal of attaining substantive equalities worldwide, Carmona 
(2009) produced a commentary on the conduct of the 159 states that have ratified 
ICESCR. These states were obligated, under the provisions of Article 11, to create an 
adequate standard of living for the peoples they govern. The author focused on the 
duty of developed nations to “respect, protect, and fulfill” the guarantees of the 
covenant (Carmona 9). Developing states were called upon to comply with the 
covenant’s aims where possible and to identify and to report areas of need. While 
states are legally obligated to comply with these standards, however, the UN is 
bereft of an effective way in which to supervise their enforcement. The optional 
protocol attached to ICESCR has yet to pass the General Assembly, but it would 
supply a system by which nations could lodge human rights complaints. 
Consequently, Carmona has called for the ratification of the optional protocol as an 
effective means for the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights to 
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ensure state compliance with ICESCR provisions. This mechanism is seen as 
essential in the eventual realization of economic rights. 
 The widely debated concept of globalization has been examined as to its 
effects on the enforcement of economic rights. Payne (2009) has analyzed its 
impacts on this branch of human rights, specifically on non-OECD member nations. 
His conclusions indicated strongly that nations must be disaggregated in order to 
delineate trends in the effects of globalization. The international economic system, 
he concluded, has had little effect in reversing economic and social inequalities 
(Payne 415). In fact, his findings demonstrated that foreign direct investment and 
official direct investment do not significantly influence the respect of these rights, 
and that portfolio investment actually hinders them. The work also concluded that 
human rights protection is not often taken into account in investment decision-
making processes of multinational corporations in foreign nations. It could be that a 
shortage of international economic regulation is responsible for these issues.  
 In research specific to the United States, Scott (2009) examined the ongoing 
failure of the nation to focus on fulfilling social and economic needs. In the context of 
the economic catastrophe of 2008, she asserted that health care reform was utterly 
insufficient in providing the protections needed for the nation’s citizens. Her 
overview of the situation calls into question the continued reluctance of the U.S. to 
ratify ICESCR, based on the requirements to provide housing, health care, and an 
adequate standard of living (Scott 22). In fact, all major developed and 
industrialized nations have ratified the treaty with the exception of the U.S. (While 
Jimmy Carter signed the treaty in 1977, he did not submit it to the Senate). Drawing 
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a stinging contrast, her missive questioned the inability of the U.S. to comply with 
the provisions of ICESCR while at the same time fielding a defense-spending budget 
that outstrips the rest of the world by far. She views the ratification of ICESCR as a 
critical step in the journey to enforceable human rights protection.  Herein, I assess 
the relationship between such regulatory measures and their tangible impact on 
day-to-day living conditions of individual citizens across OECD nations. 
 
III. Method and Hypotheses 
A. Independent Variable of Theoretical Interest 
 Thanks to the extensive work of Conway and Nicoletti (2006), the 34 nations 
of the OECD have been comparatively scaled in their implementation of licensing, 
price, and fee regulations across non-manufacturing sectors. Specific factors of 
“state control, barriers to entry, involvement in business operations and, in some 
cases, market structure” were codified and weighted (Conway and Nicoletti 2006). 
The researchers considered their approach “objective” because it was not survey-
based; instead officials from member nations and OECD experts scaled the relative 
rules, regulations and market conditions and market conditions in each country. In 
order to weight relative regulatory scores, “individual regulatory items were 
aggregated into low-level indicators which were, in turn, aggregated into 
intermediate-level indicators by industry” (Conway and Nicoletti 2006).  
Information taken from regulatory officials was then compiled into an algorithm 
and later aggregated into summary indicators across each nation. Since different 
weights were given to different regulatory procedures like licensing requirement, 
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Conway and Nicoletti admit that there is a certain degree of discretion involved in 
the weighting of these regulatory schemes. They argue, however, that the 
transparency resulting from an objective appraisal by governmental and academic 
officials rises to a level of merit useful in accumulating data otherwise difficult to 
isolate.  
 Their system rated each OECD nation’s regulatory practices on a scale from 
zero to six. A scaled score of six, for instance, would mean that a country had an 
average score of six, indicating that it had the highest regulatory levels for its 
professionals, pricing of their services, etc. This data was compiled across 
accounting, architectural, engineering, and legal professions. Adjusted for levels of 
enforcement, their study makes a substantial statement as to the comparative 
stringency of each OECD nation’s regulatory regime. Their findings regarding the 
overall regulation in each nation’s professional services sector for 2008 serve as the 
independent variable for our analysis. These statistics are the starting point in 
determining the effectiveness of different levels of professional regulation in 
advancing the goals of ICESCR.  
 
B. Dependent Variables 
 For the purposes of this study, five dependent variables will be used reveal 
the extent to which citizens experience fair wages, healthy and safe working 
conditions, equal employment opportunities, and adequate rest and leisure in their 
respective nations. These criteria were derived from Article 7 of ICESCR. Each 
dependent variable will yield a unique hypothesis. 
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 The fair-wage dependent variable is derived from OECD statistics on an 
average annual wage per worker comparison by country. This variable was 
specifically taken from data tables representing averages from the OECD National 
Accounts. The figures are representative of every sector in each economy. Taken 
from the fiscal year 2008, these figures are designed to be reliably constant time-
series and cross-country contrasts. The OECD holds that they were reported 
consistently for each of the member nations. The estimates stem from a division of a 
nation’s wages and salaries figure by an estimate of their total employed citizens. 
The final product of the calculation estimates average annual wages per full-time 
equivalent dependent employee. The numbers are reported in U.S. dollars adjusted 
for purchasing power parity and exchange rates. Based on the perception of 
industry regulation and increased wages as discussed above, it is likely that higher 
regulation will lead to higher wages. Thus, Hypothesis #1 will read as follows: As the 
scaled regulation score variable increases, the average annual wage for a given 
country will increase as well. 
 The worker health and safety dependent variable will be derived from OECD 
statistics on out-of-pocket health care expenditure of employees in each nation. 
These figures were taken from an OECD study that partnered with Eurostat and the 
World Health Organization Health Accounts. They estimate the percentage of total 
health care costs that are paid out of pocket by private households. Because of the 
availability of data, these numbers were taken from the year 2007. While this is a 
departure from the 2008 figures used in the rest of the paper, this was necessary to 
provide data for the majority of nations. With increased industry regulations, it 
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seems most likely that workers will pay less out of pocket for their health care. This 
is due both to the structure of nations that tend to have more regulated industry, 
being more likely to offer social services. Thus, Hypothesis #2 will read as follows: As 
the scaled regulation score variable increases, the employee out-of-pocket 
healthcare expenditure for a given country’s workers will decrease. 
 The equal opportunity in employment dependent variable will be taken from 
OECD statistics on male and female unemployment rates by country. They are taken 
from the OECD’s statistics database on the labor force of each nation. For the 
purposes of this study, the respective unemployment rates for both men and women 
will be analyzed in regard to the extent of regulation in the economy and are 
comparatively examined. This process is designed to ascertain the extent of equality 
in employment based on gender, in each economy. This study submits that an 
increased level of regulation within an industry will likely promote equal levels of 
male and female unemployment, considering that greater regulation would involve 
more equality measures. Thus, Hypothesis #3 will read as follows: As the scaled 
regulation score variable increases, the measures of female and male 
unemployment will be closer.  
 Finally, OECD statistics on average annual hours worked across nations will 
be used to understand the differences in comparative rest and leisure opportunities 
across nations. These data are presented in the total hours worked annually per 
worker. This average was arrived at by the division of total hours worked in a given 
year over the number of workers present in an economy. They are reliable as a 
stepping-stone for comparison between working conditions in differing economies. 
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These data are consistent with the figures on productivity also reported by the 
OECD. It is expected that industries with greater regulation will have higher 
averages for hours worked over the course of a year, given that there are more 
restrictions to entry and services are often therefore in great demand. Hypothesis #4 
will therefore read as follows: As the scaled regulation score variable increases, the 
average hours worked annually by each worker will increase as well.  
 
C. Control Variables 
 To better understand statistical significances arising from the collected data, 
several control variables were added to the study. Given the overarching 
importance of national economic strength in determining both the prevalence of 
success of economic regulatory policies, the gross domestic product of member 
nations was relevant to control.  Countries were thus controlled based on their 
annual gross domestic product for 2008. This data was taken from the OECD 
Factbook, and measures the size of GDP in billions of US dollars, adjusted for 
purchasing power parity. As the introduction of this analysis focused on the 
importance of the guarantees made by the world’s nations in the ICESCR treaty, it is 
useful to examine the importance placed on these principles by member nations 
based on their ratification of the treaty itself. Ratification would therefore indicate a 
desire to comply with the aims appointed in the treaty. Countries were thus also 
codified based on whether their government had ratified ICESCR.  The only included 
nation that had not ratified was the United States. Statistics were also culled from 
the OECD Factbook regarding population size, Gini coefficent, and labor productivity 
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for each nation. After those data were examined, a third control variable was added 
to the study: the Gini coefficient. Given the importance of wealth inequality both in 
the implementation and the effects of regulation, this factor was deemed 
appropriate to include. Thus to enhance the analysis, the results were also 
controlled on the basis of their Gini coefficients. 
 
IV. Data and Analysis 
 This study aims to juxtapose each nation’s level of regulation against its 
ability to promote the values that the majority of OECD nations have aspired to 
under the United Nations ISCER provisions. By performing a linear regression with 
the data, it will become transparent as to whether OECD economic regulation of the 
professional sector helps to deliver concrete results that improve living standards. 
For instance, it would be expected that if regulation were effective in bettering the 
lives of a nation’s citizens, nations with higher regulatory scores would produce 
higher scores in areas of worker compensation, leisure, etc. 
 To perform the regression analysis, data were pooled from their varying 
locations on the OECD website into a consolidated table. Using STATA, the 
independent variable regarding the extent of regulation within an economy was 
fitted against each individual dependent variable. Similarly, regression models were 
created with control variables for the aforementioned elements.  
 For the first analysis (see Table 1, Model 1), Average Earnings per Worker 
was regressed on the regulation coefficient for each nation. That regression 
produced a coefficient of 3,915.77. This indicates the positive relationship between 
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regulation and the average annual wage of workers. However, this coefficient does 
not quite rise to the level of statistical significance (p= .200). This means that the 
data do not indicate that the extent of regulation have a significant influence of the 
average wage of a worker in a given nation’s economy.  
 In Model 1.2, Employee Out-of-Pocket Health Expenditure was also regressed 
on the regulation coefficient for each nation. A positive correlation was found 
between out of pocket health expenditure and increased professional industry 
regulation, with a coefficient of 2.89 (p=.1065).  At this point, then, I find no support 
for the hypothesis that increased industry regulation would produce decreased 
employee out-of-pocket health expenditure. In fact, my findings would indicate that 
health care expenditure actually increased with increases in regulation—although 
this finding only borders statistical significance at the .10 level.  This phenomenon is 
perhaps explained by a link between increased costs to industry in complying with 
regulations, which are then passed on to employees. Ultimately, additional research 
is needed to further examine this occurrence. 
 Analysis of the effects of industry regulation on equal opportunity for women 
and men in the workplace required a more complex analysis.  Both the Male and 
Female Unemployment Rates for each nation’s economy were regressed on their 
respective regulation scaled scores. For female unemployment, the model yielded a 
coefficient of -66.56. This indicates that female unemployment decreases with more 
industry regulation. However, the p value is .6781, which means that the effect of 
regulation on decreasing unemployment is not statistically significant. For the male 
unemployment variable, the model yielded a coefficient of -72.96. This indicates that 
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with increased regulation, male unemployment is reduced to an even greater degree 
than female unemployment. However, male unemployment and professional 
industry regulation are not statistically significant (p = .7282). Even so, while both 
unemployment values fail to achieve statistical significance, an inference can be 
drawn from the two models. Specifically, a comparison of the results from Model 1.3 
and Model 1.4 fail to support the hypothesis that increased regulation would create 
greater gender equality in employment. 
 In Model 1.5, the Average Annual Hours Worked per Worker variable was 
regressed on the professional regulation level of each economy. A coefficient of 
75.85 was generated, meaning that workers in more regulated economies generally 
work more hours. This statistic generated a p value of .0934, meaning that the 
correlation achieves weak statistical significance. Thus, the effect of professional 
industry regulation on the amount of time workers spend at work is debatable, but 
worthy of future consideration. Hypothesis #4 indicated that hours worked would 
likely increase with increased regulation, and is not falsified by these findings. 
However, it ultimately seems illogical that more regulation would lead to more 
hours worked. One explanation could be that more regulation might place economic 
restrictions on employers, and would in turn result in fewer employees entering the 
workforce; thus, existing employees would be forced to work more hours. 
 While not every variable in the models achieved statistical significance, the 
findings were nevertheless telling. The variables that showed the greatest statistical 
significance were average hours worked and out-of-pocket health expenditures. It 
can reasonably be assumed that greater government regulation of the professional 
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service industry does play an important role in increasing the hours an employee 
works and increases healthcare expenses paid by employees. Given that these p 
values are on the higher side, though, these data indicate that professional industry 
regulation is not playing an exceptionally significant role in helping nations meet 
promises made in ICESCR and similar treaties. Rather, these findings seem to 
indicate that greater economic regulation does not necessarily lead to improved 
conditions for workers. 
 In order to better understand the true effects of professional industry 
regulation on individual national economies, a series of control variables were used 
to paint a clearer picture of economic reality. A discussion of the control variables 
and their effects on the dataset follow. 
Controlled Scenario Data and Analysis 
 To bolster the analysis from Table1, three control variables were used: gross 
domestic product in billions of dollars, ratification ICESCR and the Gini coefficient.  
These variables were introduced to create a new set of regression models (See Table 
2). As stated previously, ICESCR refers to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights passed by the United Nations. Only the U.S. has not 
ratified this treaty, but controlling for this fact altered the findings greatly. National 
data were also controlled based on their respective Gini coefficients, which is a 
measure of income inequality in each economy; the higher the Gini coefficient, the 
greater income inequality is present within a nation. These three factors were used 
to take a closer look at the effects of government regulation on economic well-being. 
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 In Model 2.1, the Average Annual Earnings per Worker variable was regressed 
with the control variables added; the regression generated a coefficient for the 
extent of industry regulation variable of 1,455. This correlation was positive, as it 
was in the first regression, but is again statistically insignificant (p =.70). These 
results would indicate that overall professional industry regulation is not likely to 
have a significant impact upon raising average annual earnings per worker, even 
less so when controlled for differences between nations. While it appears from our 
analysis that worker earnings might be mildly positively correlated with increased 
regulation, the statistics suggest that this notion is not statistically significant after 
instituting appropriate controls. 
 In Model 2.2, Employee Out-of-Pocket Health Expenditure, the results were 
equally surprising. When adjusted for statistical differences across nations, the 
analysis generated a coefficient of .099. The correlation was positive as in the first 
analysis, but again, less so than before. The controlled p value, however, was .95, 
which was significantly higher than the uncontrolled p value. This seems to indicate 
that when outside factors are controlled for, economic regulation has an even 
smaller impact on employee health expenditure. While the coefficient would still 
imply that employee health expenditure increases with increased economic 
regulation, the p value precludes reliance on this finding. It is interesting to note that 
when the variable was controlled on the basis of GDP, p=.095. This means that GDP 
weighs heavily as an influence on how much workers spend on health care. 
Economic regulation, however, cannot be tightly linked to the extent of employee 
spending on health care, because of a high p value. 
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 When controlled on the basis of GDP, ICESCR ratification, and Gini coefficient, 
the Male Unemployment and Female Unemployment variables produced an 
interesting set of findings (Model 2.3, 2.4). When male unemployment was 
regressed with the controls, the coefficient for extent of industry regulation was 
66.97. This output was significantly different from before, indicating a positive 
relationship between regulation and unemployment instead of a negative one. Also 
interesting, the p value was significantly reduced with the control variables included, 
and fell at p=.158. This means that when control factors are considered, increases in 
male unemployment could be related to the dependent variable; The p value, 
however, is not strikingly low, so the impact of regulation at all is arguable; future 
research may wish to re-analyze this relationship. It is interesting to note that GDP 
was significantly linked to rates of male unemployment, with a controlled p value 
of .000. Whether or not a country had ratified ICESCR also played into the extent of 
male unemployment, generating a controlled p value of .03.  
 With respect to female unemployment, the coefficient for extent industry 
regulation was 97.10 with the controls added (Model 2.4). This result indicated a 
positive correlation between economic regulation and female unemployment. For 
this analysis, p=.084, making it statistically significant; economic regulation, then, 
seemed to increase female unemployment rates. While that p value is not highly 
significant, it can reasonably be concluded that increased industry regulation does 
increase female unemployment. The GDP control variable also had a significant 
influence on these findings (p=.000).  
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 Overall, this study aimed to determine whether or not economic regulation 
increased gender equality in the workforce. Given the output of Model 2.3 and 
Model 2.4, though, it seems that industry regulation increases female 
unemployment at a more rapid rate than male unemployment. It would be 
reasonable to conclude, therefore, that industry regulation is definitely not 
significantly increasing gender equality, and may in fact be decreasing gender 
equality in the workplace. This finding is more reliable given the lower p values 
generated by a controlled linear regression analysis.  
 In Model 2.5, the Annual Average Hours Worked per Worker was regressed on 
the extent of industry regulation generating a coefficient of 59.95. This would 
indicate that increased regulation increases the average hours worked annually by 
each worker. The extent of this increase was reduced when controlled by various 
factors that influence each nation’s economy. This finding bordered on the generally 
accepted parameters of statistical significance (p=.136). This indicates that while not 
concretely linked, there is still an important relationship between industry 
regulation and annual average hours worked per worker. It can be safely stated, 
then, that increased economic regulation does not reduce the amount of hours each 
worker works. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that, in regard to the annual 
hours worked per worker, the control variable for Gini coefficient was statistically 
significant, with a p value of .017.  This seems to indicate that a country’s income 





V. Conclusions  
 Given the results of the initial analysis and the controlled regression, the 
most statistically significant result generated by the analysis centered on female 
unemployment. The model succeeded in finding a link between increased economic 
regulation and increased female unemployment. Reasons for this connection could 
be wide ranging, and more studies will be needed in the future to determine the true 
cause of this phenomenon. However, one possible reason for the increases in female 
unemployment associated with increased industry regulation could be a connection 
between economic regulation and the incentive of businesses to hire workers. It 
could be possible that increased levels of regulation and requirement on private 
enterprise create a disincentive for the entity to hire a greater number of employees. 
Since women have been historically underrepresented in industries such as 
engineering, medicine, and law, firms that are able to hire only a few workers may 
be more inclined to hire males first. Thus, it seems elementary to assume that 
additional requirements placed on workers, especially women who may be 
trailblazers in certain industries, would be detrimental in achieving gainful 
employment.  
 As to the broader results of this inquiry, results are varied, as p values 
generated in the controlled analyses were equivocal on the matter of statistical 
significance. The most significant connections between regulation and working 
conditions in the uncontrolled analysis implied that health expenditure and hours 
worked both increased as regulation increased. These findings were weakly 
significant though, at p levels of approximately .10. On the whole, however, this 
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analysis generates the conclusion that increased industry regulation is not closely 
linked to many noticeable increases in ICESCR compliance. 
 These results are somewhat startling. OECD nations employ various forms of 
industry regulation on their economies to improve general welfare. Even so, this 
study, could find no link between increased levels of regulation and improvements 
experienced by workers in areas of wages, health, equality, or leisure. In fact, the 
most significant findings actually indicated that increased regulation had a negative 
influence on the quality of life experienced by workers. Specifically, paying more out 
of pocket for health care and working longer hours, or perhaps not working at all, 
are the only phenomenon that seemed to bear a statistically significant link to 
increased regulation on industry. 
 This is obviously an area that requires a great deal more research. If anything, 
these results are most troubling. Global economic hardships are widespread and 
divaricated. OECD nations claim to be the most advanced, most developed systems 
in regulating economic activity. It appears, however, that the tools they claim to be 
effective are instead ineffective, and perhaps even detrimental to the citizens they 
serve. The requirement of ICESCR, with its basic human rights guarantees, is 
certainly not an outrageous infringement on national government. It is, rather, a 
useful guideline in forming goals for developed nations to achieve.  
 Based on the results of this analysis, it appears that OECD nations are not on 
the right track to achieving these aims. The economic regulations they employ over 
industry are simply not bettering the lives of their citizens. In some cases, excessive 
regulation may in fact make the lives of individual citizens more challenging—
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perhaps by inadvertently increasing expenditure on health care, hours worked, and 
unemployment. It thus appears that those countries with stricter regulations do not 
deliver positive economic results. Future papers are needed in order to discuss the 
reasons why regulation is not having a positive effect, and which types of regulation 
are most effective.   
In the end, these findings pose a very sobering question. If those nations that 
have committed themselves to compliance with ICESCR have thus far been entirely 
unsuccessful in bringing about its aims, what course should the nations of the world 
take? Clearly, ICESCR ratification is not linked with better economic outcomes for 
the world’s citizens. The United States has been universally condemned for refusing 
to ratify the treaty, yet those nations that have are not achieving better results. 
While ICESCR’s aims certainly seem noble, perhaps its weakness lies in a lack of 
direction as to how nations pursue the achievement of their aims. The treaty seems 
to exist as an idealized conception of society, without a specific plan of action for the 
world’s nations and without proof that its aims are even attainable.  This will 
undoubtedly be an issue with which the United Nations will grapple over the course 







































Coeff P  Coeff P  Coeff P  Coeff P  Coeff P  
Extent of Industry 
Regulation 











Constant   .003*** .003*** .123 .100* .000*** 
Number of 
countries 
25 27 33 33 31 
R-squared .071 .101 .004 .006 .094 
F-ratio 1.74 2.80 .12 .18 3.01 
 











Table 2: Impact of Regulation on Worker Quality of Life 














































































Constant   .775 .242 .009 .08 .001 
Number of 
countries 
18 21 26 26 26 
R-squared .104 .232 .971 .934 .328 
F-ratio .38 1.21 174.37*** 73.68*** 2.56* 
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Australia 831.2 1 1 21016 19.1 
Austria 315.6 1 1 8333 16.3 
Belgium 377.9 1 1 10517 20.6 




  Czech Republic 256.9 1 1 10262 13.6 






Finland 190.8 1 1 5307 20.4 
France 2121.7 1 1 61840 7.2 
Germany 2909.7 1 1 82772 12.8 
Greece 324.7 1 1 11218 
 Hungary 198.1 1 1 10035 25.1 
Iceland 11.8 1 1 301 16 






Italy 1871.7 1 1 58851 
 Japan 4358.3 1 1 127568 16.4 
Korea 1344.4 0 1 48607 37 
Luxembourg 41.4 1 1 471 13.4 
Mexico 1545.3 0 1 106683 
 Netherlands 675.1 1 1 16390 6 
New Zealand 116.4 1 1 4188 14.3 
Norway 280 1 1 4707 16.1 
Poland 659.2 1 1 37927 25.9 
Portugal 247.3 1 1 10620 28.2 
Slovak Republic 119.7 1 1 5393 27.4 
Spain 1434.2 1 1 44311 14 
Sweden 340.5 1 1 9159 21.6 
Switzerland 329.9 0 1 7584 17.2 
Turkey 991.7 1 1 74767 30.7 
United Kingdom 2186 1 1 61412 


























Australia 243 234 1718 
 
1.2 0.3 
Austria 82 81 1631 45464 2.7 0.27 
Belgium 170 63 1568 35260 2.2 0.27 
Canada 632 487 1727 38506 3.1 0.32 
Chile 307 254 
 
40341 2.4 
 Czech Republic 103 127 1992 
 
2.3 0.26 
Denmark 47 51 1570 17227 1.2 0.23 
Estonia 21 18 1969 41166 2.1 
 Finland 84 88 1704 
 
1 0.26 
France 1023 1044 1560 33489 2.1 0.28 
Germany 1687 1451 1430 33802 2.9 0.27 
Greece 148 230 2116 32047 2.8 0.34 
Hungary 174 155 1986 21693 3.1 0.29 
Iceland 3 2 1807 15766 1.8 
 Ireland 84 43 1631 
 
0.9 0.3 
Israel 91 90 1943 44413 3.1 
 Italy 820 872 1807 
 
3.2 0.34 
Japan 1600 1050 1772 27099 1.5 0.34 
Korea 506 267 2256 32872 2.3 
 Luxembourg 5 6 1555 26353 3.5 0.26 
Mexico 921 663 1893 49260 1.8 0.51 
Netherlands 132 128 1389 
 
1.2 0.28 
New Zealand 50 45 1746 38936 1.8 0.34 
Norway 38 30 1423 
 
1.7 0.26 
Poland 599 612 1969 42565 2.7 0.32 
Portugal 195 233 1745 14906 2.5 0.36 
Slovak Republic 125 133 1769 16001 2.3 
 Spain 1311 1280 1647 9773 2.1 0.34 
Sweden 149 147 1625 24818 0.6 0.24 
Switzerland 67 80 1640 35736 1.2 0.28 
Turkey 1877 734 
 
47269 3.4 
 United Kingdom 969 674 1652 
 
0.7 0.37 
United States 5031 3893 1796 29633 1.1 0.36 
 
